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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3828 
___________ 
 
MARIO JAIMEZ-PEREZ, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
        Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A073-122-385) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Steven A. Morley 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 2, 2014 
Before:  CHAGARES, GARTH and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 7, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Mario Jaimez-Perez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order of removal entered on August 21, 
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2013.  For the following reasons, we will grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s 
order, and remand to the BIA for further proceedings. 
I. 
 Jaimez-Perez entered the United States through the California border around 
September 1987.  In 1994, Jaimez-Perez paid smugglers to bring his wife and two 
children, all natives and citizens of Mexico, to the United States.  In 1998, Jaimez-Perez 
and his wife had a third child, who was born in the United States.  On March 30, 1998, 
Jaimez-Perez was served with a notice to appear, alleging that he was present in the 
United States without being admitted or paroled, in violation of Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  The notice to 
appear was later amended to also allege that Jaimez-Perez sought to procure an 
immigration benefit by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a fact, in violation of INA 
§ 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).  Jaimez-Perez conceded removability and 
admitted to having made misrepresentations on asylum applications in 1994 and 1996.  
Jaimez-Perez filed an application for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
1
   
                                              
1
 In order to be eligible for cancellation of removal, an alien must show, inter alia, 
continuous presence in the United States for ten years preceding the date of his 
application for cancellation of removal and that he “has been a person of good moral 
character during such period.”   INA § 240A(b)(1)(A)-(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)-
(B); see also Duron-Ortiz v. Holder, 698 F.3d 523, 527-28 (7th Cir. 2012) (deferring to 
the BIA’s reasonable conclusion that the period for determining good moral character is a 
ten-year period calculated backwards from the date on which a final administrative 
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 At a hearing in January 2006, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found that Jaimez-
Perez established ten years of continuous presence in the United States.  At a hearing in 
October 2011, an IJ found that Jaimez-Perez’s false statements on his asylum 
applications occurred prior to the relevant ten-year period and did not bar a finding of 
good moral character.  However, Jaimez-Perez testified on cross-examination that after 
his son Miguel was deported to Mexico in 2009, he sent Miguel money for food.  Jaimez-
Perez testified that he also sent money to a U.S.-citizen in Texas who helped Miguel 
reenter the United States unlawfully.  Immediately after this testimony, the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) moved to pretermit Jaimez-Perez’s application on the basis 
that the financial assistance that he provided to his son precluded a demonstration of good 
moral character.  Jaimez-Perez’s counsel then conducted a redirect examination, 
following which, the IJ gave the parties the opportunity to submit briefs concerning the 
DHS’s motion and adjourned the proceedings.   
 The IJ held a hearing in November 2011.  At that hearing, Jaimez-Perez requested 
the opportunity to submit an affidavit or testimony clarifying four points: (1) that Miguel 
called Jaimez-Perez and asked him to send $1000 to him in Mexico and $1000 to Texas; 
(2) that the money Jaimez-Perez sent was Miguel’s own money; (3) that Jaimez-Perez 
sent the money at Miguel’s direction; and (4) that Jaimez-Perez was unaware at the time 
why Miguel wanted the money.  The IJ refused Jaimez-Perez’s request to enter additional 
                                                                                                                                                  
decision is issued). 
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evidence into the record, pretermitted Jaimez-Perez’s application, and ordered him 
removed.  The BIA dismissed Jaimez-Perez’s appeal, and he timely filed a petition for 
review. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under INA § 242(a)(1), 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Because the BIA issued its own opinion on the merits, we review 
its decision rather than that of the IJ.  See Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 
2005).  However, to the extent that the BIA deferred to or adopted the IJ’s reasoning, we 
also look to and consider the decision of the IJ on those points.  See Chavarria v. 
Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  We exercise de novo review over the BIA’s 
legal decisions.  See Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 251 (3d Cir. 2009). 
III. 
 Jaimez-Perez argues that the IJ’s refusal to accept additional evidence concerning 
the money that he sent to Miguel violated his due process rights.  Notably, that evidence 
would have clarified what information Jaimez-Perez knew at the time he sent the money 
on Miguel’s behalf.  Specifically, it would have addressed whether Jaimez-Perez acted 
“knowingly,” which is the requisite mens rea under INA § 212(a)(6)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), when he assisted Miguel’s illegal entry.  See Tapucu v. Gonzales, 399 
F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that the smuggling bar requires that an individual 
“knowingly assisted an illegal entry”).  An alien who qualifies as an individual described 
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in § 212(a)(6)(E)(i) is necessarily not a person of good moral character.  INA § 101(f)(3), 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3).  Jaimez-Perez is required to demonstrate good moral character to 
be eligible for cancellation of removal.  INA § 240A(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(b)(1)(B). 
 Due process entitles an alien to “a full and fair hearing and a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence.”  Romanishyn v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 
2006); see also INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 28 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B).  The importance of that 
right “can scarcely be contested.”  Cabrera-Perez v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Here, the DHS moved to pretermit Jaimez-Perez’s application during an October 
2011 hearing before the IJ.  While Jaimez-Perez’s counsel was allowed to immediately 
conduct a redirect examination, the record was ambiguous as to what Jaimez-Perez knew 
when he sent the money.  At the end of that hearing, the IJ noted that he would not ask 
any questions of Jaimez-Perez because it was not his responsibility to “clarify the record 
for either party.”  At the November 2011 hearing, the IJ denied Jaimez-Perez’s request to 
introduce the previously described evidence in order to clarify the record.  Therefore, 
Jaimez-Perez was effectively denied a reasonable opportunity to present evidence in 
response to the DHS’s motion to pretermit his cancellation application.  See Jarbough v. 
Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2007) (“At the core of due process are the 
requirements of notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”). 
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 The absence of a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, alone, does not give 
rise to a successful due process violation claim.  To prevail on a due process claim, an 
alien “must show that substantial prejudice resulted from the alleged procedural errors.”  
Delgado-Sobalvarro v. Att’y Gen., 625 F.3d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 2010).  The evidence that 
Jaimez-Perez sought to admit specifically challenged the motion to pretermit.  Thus, 
Jaimez-Perez was prejudiced when he was denied the opportunity to create a full and 
clear record.
2
  See, e.g., Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding 
prejudice when a petitioner was denied the opportunity to present oral testimony).  
Accordingly, the IJ’s refusal to allow Jaimez-Perez to present additional evidence at the 
November 2011 hearing constituted a due process violation.  It is on that basis that we 
remand to the BIA.   
 On remand, the BIA must allow Jaimez-Perez a renewed opportunity to present 
evidence of his knowledge when he forwarded the money to Miguel.
3
  If after Jaimez-
Perez has presented new evidence, the BIA nevertheless determines that he possessed the 
                                              
2
 Although the IJ accepted a proffer of the evidence that Jaimez-Perez sought to 
introduce, the IJ reasoned that he did not find the proffer credible because it consisted of 
“post hoc rationalizations.”  ‘“While we defer to the IJ on credibility questions, that 
deference is expressly conditioned on support in the record.’”  Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 
228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Nagi El Moraghy v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195, 
205 (1st Cir. 2003)).  Consequently, an adverse credibility determination is only granted 
deference when based on specific reasoning that is supported by evidence in the record.  
Id.  Thus, while the IJ noted in his opinion that the proffer of testimony “completes the 
picture and shows that it was done with knowledge,” Jaimez-Perez’s proffer explicitly 
stated that he was ignorant of what the money would be used for.  
3
 We recognize that this will likely require that the BIA remand the case to the IJ.  See 8 
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requisite mens rea when he forwarded the money to Miguel, the BIA should reconsider 
his assertion that INA § 212(d)(11), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11), permits him to establish 
good moral character.  See Sanchez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1028, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(Paez, J., concurring).  
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s 
final order of removal, and remand for further proceedings.    
                                                                                                                                                  
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv). 
